This paper examines how the staff exercise informal governance over lending decisions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund). The essential component of designing any IMF program, assessing the extent to which a borrowing country is likely to fulfil its policy commitments, is based partly on informal staff judgments subject to informal incentives and normative orientations not dictated by formal rules and procedures. Moreover, when country officials are unable to commit to policy goals of the IMF, the IMF staff may bypass the formal channel of policy dialogue through informal contacts and negotiations with more like-minded actors outside the policymaking process. Exercising informal governance in these ways, the staff are motived by informal career advancement incentives and normative orientations associated with the organization's culture to provide favourable treatment to borrowers composed of policy teams sympathetic toward their policy goals. The presence of these sympathetic interlocutors provides the staff both with greater confidence a lending program will achieve success and an opportunity to support officials who share their policy beliefs. I assess these arguments using a new dataset that proxies shared policy beliefs based on the professional characteristics of IMF staff and developing country officials. The evidence supports these arguments: larger loan commitments are extended to countries where government officials and the Fund staff share similar professional training. The analysis implies informal governance operates in IOs not just via state influence but also through the evolving makeup, incentive structure, and normative orientations of their staffs.
Introduction

What explains the lending decisions of the International Monetary Fund? The International
Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF or Fund) is often assumed to be a technocracy, with formal rules and procedures motivating lending decisions on the basis of the severity of the economic problems facing borrowing countries (Drazen 2002; Martin 2006:142) .
Increasingly, however, a number of scholars have argued the IMF is also a political organization, with powerful countries, including but not limited to the United States, intervening in lending decisions through informal processes to further their geopolitical and financial interests (Broz and Brewster Hawes 2006; Copelovitch 2010; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Stone 2002; 2008; 2011) . Yet IMF lending decisions are not shaped by these influences alone.
This paper focuses on how these influences co-exist with staff informal governance over IMF lending decisions that manifests itself in several ways. While the staff prepare IMF programs within a formal delegation process, in practice the essential component of any program; assessing the extent to which the a borrowing country is likely to fulfil its policy commitments, is based partly on informal staff judgments subject to informal influences not dictated by formal criteria. These influences in the form of informal incentives and normative orientations shape staff judgements and lead them to provide favourable treatment to borrowers composed on policy teams sympathetic toward their policy goals. The staff also may pursue actions that go outside formal organizational rules and procedures. When country officials are unable to commit to policy goals of the IMF, the IMF staff may bypass the formal channel of policy dialogue through informal contacts and negotiations with more like-minded actors outside the policymaking process.
Informal governance can arise within the IMF whenever informal practices outside formal rules and procedures help determine outcomes.
For Stone (2011) , informal governance emerges from the interaction of three sources of power: structural power, representing the outside options available to the leading state, formal rules and procedures, which set the policy of the organization and create the parameters through which informal influence is exercised, and informal influence, which provides the leading state with the means to shape the essential features of organizational outcomes when its interests are exceptionally intense. I offer a view of informal governance that shares these features, but also broadens our understanding of it with a focus on the staff and the ideational dimension of structural power.
Like Stone, I see staff informal governance as arising from informal influence within a set of formal rules and procedures. The formal delegation process creates the parameters within which informal staff influence is exercised in much the same way formal voting rights shape the way in which informal state influence operates. In neither case are formal rules and arrangements discarded fully. Instead, the staff and governments work within and around these formal rules and arrangements to shape organizational behaviour. This is does not mean that everything constitutes informal governance and that formal governance never happens. On the contrary, it suggests the need to consider governance within IOs as often representing a hybrid of both forms rather than representing an either-or dichotomy (Stone 2011) . Put differently, informal and formal governance often operate synergistically.
In Stone's account, a crucial aspect of informal governance comes from the structural power associated with the outside options available to the leading member state and the externalities this generates for other member states. While the account here recognizes and, indeed, provides evidence consistent with such statist influence, it also points to the ideational dimension of staff interactions as a crucial but thus far neglected aspect of informal governance. This ideational dimension represents, as Strange (1988) argues, a form of structural power that comes from the development and deployment of authoritative modes of interpreting the world. Where the IMF staff possess some autonomy from member states, this means that their policy beliefs partly shape the way in which the organization is informally governed (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin 2006) . These policy beliefs may be consistent with the interests of leading member states but this does not mean they are attributable solely to them. As Woods (2006:56) observes, " [The] set of ideas [shared by the
Fund staff] is not a direct reflection of the interests of the most powerful members of the organization, even though powerful members get to influence it."
This line of argument suggests the definition of informal governance needs to be expanded to accommodate both this ideational dimension of structural power as well as informal staff influence, even when such influence emerges within the parameters of a formal delegation process. This broader definition is consistent with much recent work on governance in the European Union, which reveals how informal practices and policy beliefsincluding policy networks, cultural orientations, and unwritten rules and routines of the type featured in this account -shape political outcomes even in the context of formal rules (Christiansen and Piattoni 2003; Christiansen and Neuhold 2012) . In developing this argument, this paper shows that staff informal governance can explain a surprising amount of the variation in the way the IMF treats borrowers.
The argument here combines rationalist and constructivist insights by emphasizing informal career advancement incentives as well as normative orientations associated with the Fund's organizational culture. These factors shape the way the staff manage the complexity they face when negotiating a lending program and judging the extent to which a borrower will fulfil its policy commitments. I argue these informal incentives and orientations motivate the staff to provide favourable treatment to certain types of borrowers; in particular, those composed of policy teams with sympathetic interlocutors.
Informal career advancement incentives motivate the staff to negotiate large programs that are likely to be successful. The ability of the staff to achieve success is not simply a matter of technocratic considerations; IMF staff also must deal with complex political dynamics that can cause a program to fail. The Fund's lengthy and complicated lending experience has led the staff to conclude that success often depends on their ability to find and work with sympathetic domestic interlocutors who embrace the organization's policy goals (Woods 2006) . Rather than being simply technocratic, these policy goals also reflect the normative orientations found in the IMF's organizational culture, which is heavily influenced by common staff professional training from Anglo-American economic departments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2010) . This important socializing experience has helped to instil the Fund staff with a particular way of forming policy judgments. As a result, the Fund staff tend to seek out interlocutors whose academic credentials and professional training have instilled similar beliefs. The presence of sympathetic interlocutors provides the staff with greater confidence in achieving success and an opportunity to support policy teams that share their policy beliefs.
Other things being equal, one would expect the Fund to reward such interlocutors with favourable financial assistance. I assess this argument using a new dataset that captures the professional training characteristics of over 300 IMF staff members and over 1,000 officials from 44 developing country officials. The evidence strongly suggests that sympathetic interlocutors matter: larger loans are extended to countries where government officials and the Fund staff share similar professional training.
This paper is not the first to suggest the importance of sympathetic interlocutors for the IMF. Indeed, James Boughton (2001) , the Fund's official historian, suggests that a "silent revolution" in developing countries, in which individuals with similar professional characteristics as the Fund staff emerged in top policymaking positions, helped to underpin successful IMF policy reform efforts in the 1980s. Yet much of the evidence tends to be anecdotal and impressionistic at best, unsupported by systematic and cross-national analysis.
This paper seeks to rectify this shortcoming by assessing how the configuration of the Fund's domestic interlocutors can informally influence the size of the loan it extends to borrowers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section outlines arguments. The second section provides the empirical analysis. The final section explores implications.
The Argument
The existing literature provides some important insights into IMF lending. The IMF is a technocracy of sorts in that economic models and formal organizational rules and procedures shape the organization's basic approach to designing programs. However, this view of the IMF misses out on critical political aspects of its behaviour. Those that see the IMF as a political organization shine important light on informal state influence but miss out on critical informal influences motivating staff behaviour. To better understand how the IMF operates, we therefore need to investigate how the staff navigate the incentives they face as members of an organization and how they think about the world.
The IMF as an Autonomous Agent
The IMF staff, which grew from about 500 in 1962 to 2,610 in 2012 2,610 in (de Vries 1985 2,610 in :1010 IMF 2012a) , have a great deal of authority over the design of IMF programs. 1 In designing and negotiating programs, the staff have a significant agenda-setting capacity that developed 1 These data exclude administration staff.
and solidified in the 1950s and early 1960s. Although country representatives on the IMF Executive Board are responsible for approving all programs, these Board directors consider only those programs that the staff have designed and presented to them. Should the staff anticipate a negative reaction from the Board, it can refuse to it submit it for approval, providing it with significant gate-keeping power. Moreover, since the Board has higher turnover than the IMF staff, and thus less institutional expertise, this increases the likelihood that members will defer to staff judgments (Martin 2006:145-147) .
To be sure, the staff recognize the concerns and preferences of the Board directors, and some powerful states are, in selected cases, capable of advancing their interests through informal contacts with staff throughout the loan negotiation process (Stone 2008; 2011) .
Indeed, some directors and government officials may, on occasion, become informally involved in drafting staff proposals, particularly when there is a program for a country where clear economic and geopolitical interests are at stake. But most programs are the product of the staff, particularly when member state interests diverge, when powerful countries oppose the status quo, and, importantly, when powerful countries believe staff policy goals are aligned with their long-term preferences (Martin 2006) .
Because directors and government officials do not see confidential documents that are critical to loan negotiations, such as the mission briefing paper that determine the parameters of the staff's negotiating position and the back-to-the-office reports that survey the progress of negotiations, they cannot easily influence the content of staff prescriptions before they take place. Therefore, in most instances, member states can do little more than direct the staff to encourage, or not, a particular policy in the future, but they can do little to alter the content of programs under consideration. As a result, even though directors are formally empowered to veto a particular program, in practice they have rarely done so, generally confining their interventions to minor changes to staff proposals (Southard 1979:7) . The Board's limited ownership over the positions the staff take in loan negotiations has historically been and continues to be an issue of concern for many directors, especially those representing constituencies that lack the analytical and human resources to monitor staff proposals and to advance alternatives (IMF 1999:13, 34; Martin 2006:7) .
Formal Rules and Informal Staff Influence and Motivations
A formalized process, as outlined in the IMF Articles of Agreement and organizational procedures, governs access to IMF resources (Mussa and Savastano 1999) . In principle each member state has the right to participate in a program when it faces balance of payments problems. The request for financial assistance comes from the member state and then enters a bureaucratic process governed by formal organizational procedures
The staff from regionally organized area departments has primary responsibility for design of programs. When a request for financial assistance is made, the area department staff draw up a blueprint that contains a preliminary assessment of the central elements of the adjustment program and the size of the IMF loan. A mission briefing paper summarizing the blueprint is then prepared and circulated for comments to other departments. After incorporating comments from other departments and receiving approval from IMF management (the Managing Director and Deputy Managing Directors), the staff mission is dispatched to the member capital to negotiate a program. The outcome of these negotiations is a letter of intent that specifies the country's proposed adjustment program.
Back at IMF headquarters, the mission team prepares a staff report that includes an account of discussions with country officials, details of the agreed policy adjustments, and the size of the loan. The report and letter of intent are then circulated to other departments for review, who check that the proposed loan is consistent with IMF procedures and offer their views, which are often critical, about its risks. A revised draft is then submitted to management for clearance, who then takes it to the Board for approval. Although management has the final decision on the size and design of the loan, it generally makes no changes to the features agreed by the area department mission (Mussa and Savastano 1999:12) .
The size of the any loan proposed by the staff is shaped by country-specific quotas that specify the amount of access to IMF resources a country is permitted under ordinary circumstances. Formal rules ordinarily limit cumulative access to IMF resources to 300 percent of a country's quota, but such limits can be waived during exceptional circumstances, as they were during the Asian crisis in 1997 and the recent global financial crisis. These projections, though developed within a formalized process, are not dictated by formal criteria alone. Rather, they are partly informal in origin and are subject to informal motivations. As Randall Stone (2011:137, emphasis added) suggests, "in essence, these [staff] projections are judgments about what is politically feasible." Without a formal set of criteria to make these judgments, the staff are provided some discretion to set policy informally based on their assessment of the extent to which a borrower will likely fulfil its policy commitments.
If staff judgments do not derive from formal criteria alone, how then are they formed?
Public choice scholarship suggests the IMF staff face bureaucratic incentives to engage in rent-seeking behaviour to maximize their power, autonomy, and budgets (Vaubel 1996; Dreher and Vaubel 2004) . From this perspective, subject to a financial constraint, these bureaucratic incentives should induce staff judgments in favour of proposing larger loans regardless of the country's situation.
However, others scholars, including some offering a broader public choice analysis of the IMF, suggest the staff also face career advancement incentives to be more selective in forming judgments (Willett 2002; Woods 2006) . Promotions within the IMF are linked a number of different factors, including years of service and quality of technical skills (Momani 2005) . Although there is no formal criterion stipulating as such, there is also an implicit but widespread view within the organization that advancement within the IMF depends on negotiating large and successful programs. and therefore a stronger commitment to the policies it promotes. Similar professional characteristics thus aid in producing the shared policy beliefs that Kahler finds so critical to the success of IMF programs.
Several IMF officials and close observers of the Fund echo these arguments.
Certainly, Boughton's discussion of the "silent revolution" attests to the importance of such factors. Similarly, Ngaire Woods (2006:72) In supporting sympathetic interlocutors the argument here is not that the staff lend blindly lend to those who share their beliefs. The staff are aware that country officials, even those sympathetic to their policy goals, may still have credibility problems because of domestic political constraints (Vreeland 2003 them to prioritize designing programs based on policy beliefs, to which other similarlytrained economists are often sympathetic, aimed at maximizing efficiency, with less consideration given to political feasibility. The IMF's organizational culture, which emphasizes first-best policy prescriptions, reinforces the tendency of the staff to prioritize efficiency over political feasibility (Momani 2005; Chwieroth 2010a:34-40) . Indeed, as one internal evaluation of IMF operations suggests, the staff often "fails to take into account existing political constraints, or is so optimistic about the ability of governments to overcome them that it does not consider second-best policy choices that would be consistent both with the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and country-specific political realities" (IMF 2004:12) . 7 The staff, though cognizant of domestic constraints, also may be overly confident in the efficacy of loans as instruments to enhance the domestic negotiating position of sympathetic interlocutors against their opponents (Woods 2006 to err on the side of larger programs for all countries (Willett 2002:69) .
The Board, for its part, is also likely to look favourably upon programs negotiated with sympathetic interlocutors. But geopolitical and financial interests may lead powerful countries to err on the side of larger programs for strategically important countries, not just those where sympathetic interlocutors are present. As a result, the approach favoured by the IMF and its major shareholders can diverge, particularly when geopolitical and financial interests are at stake; with the Fund on occasion refusing to support governments that demonstrate an inability to commit to its policy's goals, while powerful countries pursue their interests even when they lead them to support programs where sympathetic interlocutors are not present.
The different approaches that the IMF and the U.S. took to Argentina in the 1980s vividly illustrate the possibility for divergence. In the mid-1980s the IMF was reluctant to support "heterodox" stabilization programs that employed wage and price controls. But
Argentine officials, by appealing to concerns over the systemic implications of default, enlisted U.S. officials to press the IMF to lend (Kaufman 1989:400-401) . On this occasion the IMF bent to the contrasting approach of its most powerful shareholder, but, interestingly, it refused to augment the level of financial assistance available to Argentina (James 1996:377-378) . The failure of Argentina to commit fully to the policy goals of the IMF contributed to its hesitation to augment its financial commitment.
In 1988 The weak version of the symptoms of influence argument is problematic in that it attributes too much of IMF lending decisions to shareholder preferences and not enough to autonomous staff behaviour. Certainly, the Fund staff is keenly aware of the preferences of their powerful shareholders and they rarely stake out a contrary position. Nonetheless, though powerful shareholders may favour crafting larger loans for countries with "good" government officials, unless these shareholders actively intervene in the design of a loan we would be attributing too much influence to these actors and not enough to the staff. Indeed, adherents to the weak version of the symptoms of influence argument set too high of a bar for identifying autonomous behaviour.
Autonomous staff behaviour is present not only when IOs overcome opposition from powerful shareholders or when they act contrary to their interests; it also manifests itself in more subtle ways. Though loans for countries with sympathetic interlocutors may help powerful shareholders advance their interest in rewarding "good" government officials, unless these shareholders actively pressure the Fund, such lending decisions should be seen as a form of autonomous behaviour (Martin 2006 entitled to participate in an IMF program and thus requests are rarely rejected. However, the loan commitment ratio is much more susceptible to the influences discussed. While informal staff influence may also extend to the design of conditionality, I focus here on the size of the loan because, as Stone (2011:136) suggests, "the amount of access is one of the most intensely political decisions" within the IMF and because, as opposed to the design of conditionality, it is a decision where the staff are expected to have less control (Copelovitch 2010:73) . Moreover, the size of the loan is generally more strongly linked than the design of conditionality with the theoretical emphasis here on the likelihood of program success, and thus more susceptible to the informal motivations outlined above (Stone 2011:136; Ivanova et al. 2003 ).
8 I exclude loans made under the IMF's Structural Adjustment Fund and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fund -the two other principal IMF lending programs -because these programs are likely to be extended under different lending criteria due to their focus on long-term structural adjustment rather than short-term balance of payments support. While it would be worthwhile to analyze more recent loans, the time frame ends in 1998 due to data availability constraints on the IMF staffing profiles. Telephone directories, the source for IMF staffing data (see below), were not available after 1998 from the IMF Archives or from the IMF Communications Department. It is unclear whether this is due to selective deposit or selective survival. Notwithstanding this constraint, the time frame under analysis does permit investigation of the period when the IMF was most active in lending to developing countries. 9 Both the size of the loan and the quota are measured in millions of standard drawing rights (SDRs). Joseph Joyce generously shared these data, which were gathered from the IMF's Annual Report.
The amount of loans outstanding has fluctuated significantly over time, with peaks observed during the debt crisis of the 1980s and during the emerging market crises of the late 1990s. The size of loans in the dataset varies between a minimum of nearly 15 percent of quota to a maximum of nearly 1940 percent. Since these data are positively skewed, I use the natural log of the loan ratio.
At the heart of my argument is the notion that the IMF's loan commitment depends in part on shared policy goals between the IMF area department staff and their interlocutors in the borrowing country, which are typically the finance minister and the head of the central bank.
Building on earlier work on the socializing experience of common professional training, I develop new data using the educational background of the IMF staff and borrowing country officials as a proxy for shared policy beliefs.
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Extensive research, much of it using surveys, has shown professional training in Anglo-American economics departments to be an important socializing experience in generating shared policy beliefs (Chwieroth 2010a; Colander 2008; Colander and Klamer 1987; Klamer and Colander 1990; Fourcade 2009 ). While consensus does not extend to all areas, these surveys show that belief heterogeneity tends to be less severe among Anglo-American-trained economists, particularly when it comes to a theoretical core stressing market efficiency and rationality, compared to that between American-American-trained economists and those trained elsewhere. Historically, the data show that the Fund has encountered the fewest sympathetic interlocutors in sub-Saharan Africa, which could help account for its relative lack of success in the region.
I use these data to create three variables: (1 (Braumoeller 2004 ).
Admittedly, common professional training is only one of the possible ways that shared policy beliefs can emerge. In addition, as suggested earlier, it also may not necessarily lead the Fund staff and government officials to agree on the details of a program.
Both possibilities should make it more difficult to uncover a positive relationship, as they should result in a negative bias against the hypothesized relationship.
In the statistical analysis I also control for alternative explanations featured in the (2007) provides these data. If the U.S. intervenes to further its geopolitical and financial interests, politically influentially and financially important countries should receive larger loans. As a control for domestic political constraints I include the natural log of the number of veto players (CHECKS), which Vreeland (2003) finds to be an important determinant of IMF lending decisions.
The third set of controls includes proxies for organizational imperatives identified by public choice scholars that may lead the Fund to provide more generous loans when it has more resources to lend and when its members are considering whether to increase the organization's resources via a quota review. I use two variables from Dreher and Vaubel (2004) to assess these possibilities. One variable, the IMF's liquidity ratio, divides the sum of outstanding loan commitments by its total quota resources. The other variable is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in the years a quota review was underway.
Since the sample of countries participating in IMF programs is systematically different from the overall population, statistical analyses of IMF loan commitments must address the issue of non-random selection (Steinwand and Stone 2008) . I address this issue using propensity score matching. The basic intuition is to match each country-year under an IMF program (a "treated" observation) with a country-year without an IMF program (a "control" observation) based on the observed covariates that are as close to identical as possible. This "nearest-neighbour" strategy provides a propensity score for each observation ranging from zero to one that captures the predicted probability of IMF program participation. Inclusion of this propensity score in the loan commitment models helps to minimize selection bias (Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart 2007) .
In both the loan commitment and program participation specifications, I also control for temporal dependence. While tests indicate that serial correlation is not present in the loan commitment specification, I account for a country's past history with the IMF by including a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a county is already under an IMF program. 16 In the binary program participation specifications, where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if a country received an IMF loan in a given year, I control for temporal dependence using the country-specific number of years since the last IMF program, its square, and its cube (Carter and Signorino 2010) .
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
For the loan commitment specification, I ran ordinary least squares regression with panel corrected standard errors. 18 I use a logit analysis to generate the propensity scores included in the subsequent loan commitment specification. Table 1 presents the results. The 16 Since the observations are unequally spaced panel data, I ran a Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally best invariant (LBI) test, which failed to reject the null of no autocorrelation. 17 The results are unchanged if I instead use the cubic splines approach of Beck et al. (1998) . 18 Anglo-American policy team is a slow-moving variable, which poses challenges for the use of conventional fixed effects models. I therefore ran a model using fixed effects vectors decomposition (Plümper and Troeger 2007; Beck 2011) , which produced similar results as those reported here. The remaining models in Table 1 At higher levels of Anglo-Americanization within the relevant area department, the staff increasingly defines orthodoxy in terms of a particular set of theoretical principles. In such circumstances, the absence of sympathetic interlocutors in a borrowing country may 21 In terms of goodness of fit, in contrast to R 2 , a smaller number is better for the BIC and AIC.
lead the staff to be normatively oriented against such a government, sceptical of its commitment to the IMF's policy goals, and thus less willing to treat it favourably. On the other hand, greater belief homogeneity within particular area departments likely induces the staff to be normatively oriented toward interlocutors who share their professional characteristics and to have greater confidence that such interlocutors are more likely to produce successful programs. The result is a willingness to provide more generous loan commitments.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Using the results from Model 8, Table 2 and Asia (9 cases), with Mexico (1995 ), Thailand (1997 , and Indonesia (1997 as recent examples.
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Since these cases are somewhat collinear with U.S. financial and geopolitical interests, it is difficult to tease apart the relative importance of statist and staff influence. U.S. financial interests were intense (one standard deviation above their mean) in four of these 25 cases. 23 In such cases informal statist and staff influence co-exist, and, like Indonesia in 1997-1998, the relative importance of statist versus staff influence is hard to ascertain because U.S. preferences fit so closely with those of the IMF staff as well as management (Stone 2010:170-173; IEO 2003:12-13 Informal statist and staff influence also likely co-exists in countries, such as Pakistan (1994, 1995, 1997) and the Philippines (1984, 1986, 1991) , which play important roles in US foreign policy but generally vote against it in the U.N. General Assembly (Stone 2011:165-166) . Among the 25 cases it easier to conclude that staff influence is likely substantively more important than statist influence in those, such as Sri Lanka (1983) , where the interests of powerful countries are less intense.
Turning to the remaining explanations, variables associated with more formalized technocratic considerations receive some support in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8, which suggest larger loan commitments are associated with smaller money supplies relative to reserves, larger public debt burdens, short-term debt profiles, banking crises, and higher U.S. interest rates. Support for political considerations is mixed. On the one hand, there is consistent 22 An additional two cases are found in the Middle East (Jordan 1994 (Jordan , 1996 and Europe (Turkey 1994) . 23 The cases are Argentina (1992 Argentina ( , 1996 and Mexico (1983 Mexico ( , 1995 . 24 The cases are Argentina (1992 Argentina ( , 1996 , Chile (1983 ), Costa Rica (1995 ), El Salvador (1993 ), and Turkey (1994 
Conclusion
Although rationalists and constructivists tell us to expect considerable autonomy for IO staff, our understanding of how the staff will behave given this autonomy remains limited.
With respect to scholarship on the IMF, inadequate attention has thus far been given to how the staff exercises informal governance over its lending decisions. Rather than viewing IMF lending decisions as beholden to formal technocratic considerations or informal member state influence alone, I have argued that informal staff influence, motivated by informal incentives and orientations, also plays an important role. The presence of sympathetic interlocutors in borrowing country policy teams provides the staff both with greater confidence a lending program will achieve success and an opportunity to support officials who share their commitment to a particular set of policy beliefs. The statistical evidence suggested that these career advancement incentives and normative orientations, which weigh heavily on staff judgments and lead them to prefer to work with sympathetic interlocutors, do shape IMF lending outcomes.
A clear implication of this analysis is that a fuller understanding of how IOs work and evolve requires close attention to the evolving makeup, incentive structure, and normative orientations of their staffs. Much of the existing literature has yet to devote much attention to such important features of IO behaviour. The rational design approach implied IO behaviour was largely a function of the institutional features crafted by states (Koremenos et al. 2001) . The recent behavioural turn in the study of IOs has brought to the light the importance of informal governance, but has remained decidedly state-centric. The findings reported here suggest these understandings of IO behaviour are incomplete. The behaviour of IOs is driven not just by formal rules or informal state influence but also by how their staffs exercise informal influence and respond to informal incentives and normative orientations.
Even though it may partly occur within a formal delegation process, our conceputalization of informal governance needs to be expanded to accommodate these dimensions of informal staff influence and structural power.
This finding not only speaks to theoretical debates over IO behaviour, but also to current debates over IMF reform. The results provide evidence that the staff provide favourable treatment to government officials with similar professional characteristics. While such behaviour is understandable given their incentives and normative orientations, it also serves to elevate certain policy goals over others, to engender blind spots in staff analysis, and to downplay "local knowledge," thus generating resentment toward IMF orthodoxy and challenges to the organization's legitimacy. The recent global financial crisis has only served to heighten such negative perceptions.
To the extent these criticisms have some basis; these findings should add impetus to efforts to broaden the Fund staff's recruitment base and to expand the array of actors with which the staff engage in their negotiations and consultations. IMF Staff, 1946 -1998 IMF Interlocutors, 1969 -1998 1969 1970 -1979 1980 1990 -1998 
